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Summary:  
We examine whether absorptive capacity represents a compulsory reason to reject the 
proposal of a large aid increase to support a big push. We argue that poverty trap is a 
probability for many countries, in particular the Least Developed Countries and that an aid 
increase is relevant for them. Moreover we show that the decrease in marginal aid returns is 
slower in vulnerable countries, what enhances the rationale to take vulnerability as one of the 
aid allocation criteria. We then examine the main limits to absorptive capacity, such as 
disbursement constraints and short term bottlenecks, macro economic troubles, including loss 
of competitiveness and macroeconomic volatility, as well as institution weakening. The 
general conclusion we draw to reconcile the two approaches is that absorptive capacity 
strongly depends on aid itself or on its very modalities. Big push and absorptive capacity 
approaches cannot be reconciled without an aid reform coming with an aid increase.  First, 
needed is to balance the utilisation of aid between directly productive and social activities, in 
order to avoid transitory loss of competitiveness. Second, schemes helping to use aid as 
insurance against exogeneous shocks are to be enhanced because they lower the risk of Dutch 
disease and contribute to a faster and more equitable long term growth. Finally a 
performance-based conditionality should be substituted to the traditional policy-based one in 
order to cope with several absorptive capacity limitations, most importantly the socio-
political one. An aid supported big push will not be effective without a new ownership of  
policy by the recipient countries. 
 
 
 
Résumé : 
Cet article examine si  la capacité d'absorption représente une raison suffisante pour écarter 
la proposition d'accroître fortement l'aide de façon à soutenir un "big push" ou "forte 
impulsion". Nous soutenons que pour de nombreux "pays moins avancés" l'existence d'un 
piège à pauvreté est une hypothèse probable et qu'il est pertinent d'accroître l'aide à ces pays. 
De plus nous montrons que la décroissance des rendements de l'aide est moins rapide dans 
les pays vulnérables, ce qui renforce la logique de prendre en compte la vulnérabilité dans les 
critères d'allocation de l'aide. Nous examinons aussi les principales limites à la capacité 
d'absorption de l'aide, telles que les contraintes de versement et les goulots d'étranglement à 
court terme, les troubles macroéconomiques, en particulier le risque de perte de compétitivité 
et d'instabilité macroéconomique, ainsi que l'affaiblissement institutionnel. La conclusion 
générale est que la capacité d'absorption dépend fortement de l'aide elle-même et de ses 
modalités. Big push et capacité d'absorption correspondent à deux points de vue qui semblent 
réconciliables si une réforme de l'aide accompagne son accroissement. Pour cela il est 
nécessaire de garder un équilibre entre les utilisations sociales et directement productrices de 
l'aide, d'utiliser l'aide comme assurance contre les chocs extérieurs et de substituer une 
conditionnalité de performance à la conditionnalité traditionnelle fondée sur les instruments. 
Une aide à une "forte impulsion" ne peut être efficace si les pays qui la reçoivent ne se 
réapproprient pas leur politique 
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     Introduction 
 
Two opposite views seem to dominate the present aid debate, the “big push” thesis, 
supported in particular by Jeffrey Sachs (2005) and relying on the poverty trap concept, and 
the absorptive capacity concern, collecting through a multifold concept several oppositions to 
the first approach. On one hand the United Nations mot d’ordre “doubling aid to reduce 
poverty by half”, on the other one the reviving scepticism, fitting the view that aid will not be 
absorbed usefully, and finding an utmost expression in the recent book of Bill Easterly 
(2006a):  the End of Poverty  then faces the White Man’s Burden. Incidentally the word “big 
push” does not appear in the index of Sachs book, neither “absorptive capacity” in Easterly 
index, but “big push” can be found in the index of Easterly, referring to the ‘legend of the big 
push”, and “absorptive capacity” in that of Sachs, a reference leading to the statement: 
“Limited absorptive capacity is not an argument against aid. It is the very reason that aid is 
needed!”  
 
  These two opposite views are not really new and they paradoxically have common 
roots. One author, Rosenstein-Rodan, may even appear as a major contributor both to the big 
push theory and to the absorptive capacity concept applied to foreign aid. He first expressed 
arguments, associated to the idea of increasing returns, for a big push  in 1943, joined during 
the fifties by other development pioneers, in particular  Nurkse (1953), who underlined the 
need of a balanced growth to break the vicious circles of the supply and demand of capital. 
The same Rosenstein-Rodan presented in 1961 the most comprehensive use of the absorptive 
capacity concept to measure the capital needs of the developing countries, following a famous 
proposal by Millikan and Rostow (1957) to allocate aid according to the absorptive capacity 
(once taken into account domestic saving). Nurkse himself referred to the limitations of 
absorptive capacity of aid for investment, as did, even shortly, most of the main works on 
development economics of the fifties, limitations first noted in the Fourth Annual  Report of 
the IBRD in 1949  (historic survey may be found in Guillaumont 1971). 
 
The reason why absorptive capacity and big push did not appear half a century ago as 
contradictory as they now seem to be is double. First, both concepts rely on the idea that low 
income countries face structural obstacles to growth, which are reflected in the absorptive 
capacity and require massive investment in interdependent sectors to be overcome. Second, 
aid is today likely to significantly increase: absorptive capacity then becomes a kind of 
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warning on the risk of waste, whereas it was in the past rather a criterion used to mobilize 
more aid. Fifty years ago the main criticisms of aid were not presented under this umbrella. 
Coming from rather extreme and opposite political positions, either liberal or radical, they 
prosecuted a support given through aid either to enlarging states or to non democratic regimes 
and corrupted bourgeoisies. 
 
The opposition now is somewhat different. The main argument for doubling aid is not 
simply to fill a financial gap, but to push the countries out of a stagnation trap from which 
they cannot escape otherwise ( nevertheless without any clear statistical link between the size 
of the needed push and the aid requirements). The first criticism has then been an attack 
against the idea of a trap and its big push corollary. Other criticisms or reservations, most of 
them under the notion of absorptive capacity, intend to evidence all the reasons why an 
increased aid is likely to be useless, wasted or even harmful, and consequently not leading to 
a big push and a subsequent escape from poverty. 
 
In this context the notion of absorptive capacity of external aid has been used in 
several different meanings, sometimes contradictory. Going from the shorter to the longer 
term issues, we can identify four main meanings. A first one refers to the disbursement 
constraints or the disbursement slowness, evidenced by a low rate of utilisation of credits or a 
long lag between commitments and disbursements; it is a “pipeline approach”. The second 
meaning refers to possible macroeconomic troubles associated with large aid inflows 
(disbursements): these troubles include in particular a loss of competitiveness, through real 
currency appreciation (“Dutch disease approach”) and the recently debated effects of aid 
volatility. The third and more classical meaning of absorptive capacity is a drop (possibly a 
cancellation) of the marginal return of aid beyond a certain amount, analysed at the macro 
level, in terms of growth, or at the micro level, in terms of projects or specific expenditures 
(“decreasing returns approach”). Finally a fourth meaning should be added, which is a 
weakening of institutions induced by aid or a lack of social assimilation (“socio political 
approach”). 
 
In this paper we examine whether absorptive capacity, according to each of these four 
meanings, represents a compulsory reason to reject the proposal of a large aid increase to help 
poor countries to move out of the underdevelopment trap, subject to the existence of such a 
trap. To do so we successively consider the following points and corresponding questions: 
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- poverty trap hypothesis: is it a rule or a legend ? We argue it is a probability for 
many, in particular the Least Developed Countries: for them an aid increase is 
consequently relevant; 
- disbursement constraints and short term bottlenecks: why is there an 
underutilisation of credits? To overcome the constraint, a reform of aid procedures 
is needed; 
- macro economic troubles, including loss of competitiveness and macroeconomic 
volatility: to what extent is there a risk of Dutch disease? Needed here is both to 
focus on productivity and on the stabilizing impact of aid; 
- decreasing returns: why are they more or less quickly decreasing? We argue that 
the decrease is slowed down in vulnerable countries, what makes these countries a 
priority in aid allocation; 
- institution weakening: how can it be avoided? To a large extent by a performance 
based conditionality. 
-  
 
1 - Underdevelopment trap: not a rule, but a probability for many, in particular the 
LDCs 
 
The possibility that low income countries be locked in a poverty or underdevelopment 
trap and be moved out of it thanks to large aid inflows may be considered as the basis of the 
UN Millenium Project and of the Report of the Blair Commission on Africa, as well as of the 
related proposals to find new and high additional development resources such as the 
International Financial Facility. However it has been recently challenged in several writings, 
some ones rather sophisticated and academic, other ones rather polemical. It is actually a 
major and complicated issue. Without entering into the details of the debate, we have a look at 
the main lines of the recent attack, which appear twofold: i) there would be neither analytical 
or empirical ground to the existence of a trap, ii) nor evidence of the aid as a factor likely to 
support a big push (out of the trap). In spite of these attacks, we conclude on the present 
relevance of an aid supported big push.  
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 A truncated criticism of the concept of a low level equilibrium 
 
  The concept of poverty trap at the macro level, developed in the fifties in particular by 
Leibenstein (1954) or Nelson (1956), has recently been revitalized by Sachs et al. (2004), who 
have re-examined three sources of a trap, i.e. of a low level stable equilibrium, namely  
increasing returns, the saving income function and  the fertility income function. The two first 
grounds have been debated in particular by Kraay and Raddatz (2005), who argue that the 
functions are not shaped as it would be required to lead to a trap, and their scepticism seems 
endorsed, by the Global Monitoring Report 2005, where we read: “In general…neither 
macroeconomic nor microeconomic evidence tends to support the existence of such traps”. 
Criticism has been expressed in a more radical way by Easterly in a recent review paper 
(2006b) and the book previously quoted (2006a). 
 
To the analytical scepticism has been added a purely empirical argument which can be 
summarized as follows: among the countries which were forty or fifty years ago low income, 
a not negligible number has been able to grow significantly and to move up from this low 
level. Then a low level of income is not by itself a stable equilibrium or a trap, what cannot be 
denied.  
 
The point is that among the initially low income countries many have remained poor 
and that they share common structural characteristics, suggesting that the meeting of these 
characteristics creates the conditions of a low level equilibrium. In a forthcoming book we 
identify these features of the persistently low income per capita countries as the conjunction 
of a relatively low level of human capital and a high vulnerability to exogeneous shocks 
(Guillaumont 2006): these two structural handicaps interact to make sustained growth rather 
unlikely for logical reasons, not rejected by econometric tests. And they are precisely, with 
the low level of income per capita, the three features used at the UN to identify the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). It then appears that a group of countries, roughly corresponding 
to the present LDCs, can be considered as the most likely future low income countries. Briefly 
stated, not all low income countries are in a trap, but some of them are clearly in and these 
ones are the LDCs. 
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           More precisely we find that: 
-while there is no absolute convergence among the whole set of developing countries, there 
are clearly two regimes of absolute convergence, one for the non LDC developing countries, 
the other for the LDCs, at a significantly lower level, and leading to a lower steady state; 
- on a long (thirty year) period, differences of growth of income per capita among developing 
countries are rather well explained by the three factors corresponding to the LDC 
identification criteria: besides initial income per capita, the two variables reflecting structural 
handicaps, an economic vulnerability index and an index of human capital weakness, both 
expressed in logs, are significant negative factors, meaning that they reflect an obstacle to 
growth or the possibility of a trap all the more that they are interacting (quite weaker results 
are found with the linear specification or even weaker with the logs of the corresponding 
human capital and low vulnerability indices). 
 
Of course there can be other interpretations of the logic behind the notion of 
underdevelopment trap (see for instance Berthélemy 2006), but what seems required is to look 
for the structural specificities or initial conditions of the countries which were poor and long 
stayed so.  
 
Misuse of aid effectiveness literature to deny the possibility of a big push.  
 
Another argument used to deny the possibility of a big push supported by a high aid 
inflow in order to move out of the trap would be found in the mitigated results of cross 
country regressions on aid effectiveness.  
 
First these results are not as uncertain as often argued, although the aggregate concept 
of aid used has a so heterogeneous content it makes difficult to obtain very strong results. As 
we shall see later, there are some positive results on aid effectiveness (possibly conditional on 
specific factors) which have been found robust in external assessments (see Roodman 2004, 
for instance, on Hansen and Tarp 2001 and on Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001) and in the new 
results published by Burnside and Dollar (2004). In particular we have argued that aid is 
efficient to promote growth in countries vulnerable to exogeneous shocks (Guillaumont and 
Chauvet 2001, Chauvet and Guillaumont 2004, 2006). We note that in a recent sceptical 
survey of aid-growth regressions (Rajan and Subramanian 2005b),  which is referred to by 
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opponents to the idea of a big push supported by aid, the authors omit to consider the 
vulnerability factor of aid effectiveness. 
 
Second it is a debatable assessment to consider that, among those low income 
countries which have been able to emerge, no one was supported by a large, even transitory, 
inflow of external aid. The most successful aid is precisely that which leads to a self sustained 
growth, then to a weaker aid-growth relationship. It does not seem that present econometric 
studies have adequately addressed the time sequence of this relationship. Historical 
perspective is needed. Let us look at the most typical cases of countries which have been in 
the past decades or are now emerging, such as Korea, Mauritius, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Tunisia...They all received at the beginning of their growth period a significant inflow of aid 
which has subsequently and quite normally decreased as far as growth was going on1: for 
instance in Korea the average aid to GDP ratio has decreased from 6.3% in the sixties to 0.1 
in the eighties, and in Tunisia from 8.1 % in the sixties to 1.5 in 1990-2003. Let us look at the 
few LDCs the graduation of which has been decided by the UN, after they enjoyed a pretty 
growth: Botswana in 1994, Cape Verde and Maldives in 2004, with postponed 
implementation of the decision. They all have themselves received a level of aid initially quite 
high, then declining, suggesting that countries likely to be locked into a trap can escape with 
the help of international community: for instance in Botswana the aid to GDP ratio has 
decrease from 18.8% in the eighties to 1.9% in 1990-20032 .  Saying that, we do not forget 
that all those countries were not the LDCs suffering from the most severe initial conditions, in 
particular with regard to human capital, what made easier to move up. But these conditions, 
and noticeably human capital, may themselves been supported by former aid. If the role of aid 
inflows is to lead to sustained growth, it is well to facilitate the progressive change of 
preconditions of a possible take off3. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Even in India, where due to size the aid to GDP ratio has always been low, this one appears, once adjusted for 
the size factor, to have also been significant, then declining 
2
 In Cape Verde it has decrease from 37 % in the eighties to 16 % in 2000-2003 and in the Maldives from 14 % 
to 3;7 %.  
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2 - Disbursement constraints: a need to reform procedures. 
 
Disbursement raises the first difficulty to absorb more aid. The lag between 
commitments and disbursements has been considered for many years (Guillaumont 1967). 
Curiously it has not led to many studies, although quantitative analysis can be easily applied. 
Anyway a complaint of receivers (and sometime of donors) about the large gap between 
cumulative commitments and disbursements, so called “pipeline”, is more and more frequent. 
Actually the rate of underutilisation of credits is in some cases dramatically high, leading to 
scepticism on the possibility to use significantly higher amount of aid. 
 
The reasons behind this may  lie in the features of the receiving countries, such as low 
administrative capacities or weak transportation infrastructure, as well as in the non-fulfilment 
of the conditions attached to disbursement. However with that case in view Svensson (2006) 
has been led to refer to “a strong bias towards “always” disbursing committed funds to the ex 
ante designated recipient, or project, irrespective of the recipient government’s performance, 
or the conditions of other potential aid recipient countries (projects)”: here the risk is that of 
an excess of spending under the budget pressure, rather than the risk of a disbursement lag… 
 
    But the disbursement lags may also result from the inadequacy of the aid modalities to 
the recipient features. The multiplicity of aid sources in a country (the “aid fragmentation”) 
with different procedures, forms and disbursement conditions is all the more a problem that 
the country is small and has low administrative capacities. Donors are then inclined to target 
supports on the reinforcement of administrative capacities of receivers, rather than to modify 
their own behaviour. It is a valuable but a long term process, as well as the improvement of 
transport facilities and infrastructure which also make the disbursement of project aid easier. 
Identifying and attacking such bottlenecks will stay for a long time on the agenda. 
 
A lesson is to look for more appropriate procedures…The Declaration of the Paris 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, besides considerations on “alignment” and 
“predictability” on which we come back later, underlines the need for an “harmonisation” of 
procedures and defines related indicators. However, to quote Peter Heller (2005): “Current 
approaches with respect to the goals for harmonization…are still far short of the professed 
                                                                                                                                                        
3
 More generally the issue of evaluation is the counterfactual as usual. It is always difficult to say what would 
have happened without aid in very poor countries 
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objectives and aid recipients have reasons to be uncertain about how long it will take for these 
gaps to be closed. Moreover, it must be daunting for LDCs to catalogue both the number of 
donors with which they must work, as well as the multiplicity of their objectives, modalities 
of operation, underlying criteria for aid levels, and conditionalities and terms of aid”. 
 
One can wonder whether in view of the difficulties met in the harmonisation process, 
still very slow, a more radical reform is not needed, consisting, as we shall see in our last 
point, in adopting an outcome based conditionality. It would meet both the concerns about 
disbursement lags and about disbursement incentives, avoiding bias from either source. 
 
 
 
3 - Macroeconomic troubles from higher aid inflows: are they real troubles? 
 
      We now suppose that not only commitments, but also, disbursements are significantly 
increased, possibly with delay. Disbursement lags postpone the risk of macro economic 
troubles we now examine. Two kinds of troubles have been extensively considered in the 
recent literature. One is the risk resulting from an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The 
other one, likely to reinforce the first one, is the risk associated to the volatility of aid flows. 
While not negligeable these two risks are often overestimated. At least they require adequate 
treatment from an assessment with regard to some basic economic principles. 
  
      Real exchange rate concern: will aid increase induce a loss of competitiveness?  
 
       There are a lot of works insisting on the risk of a real exchange rate appreciation 
following a scaling up of aid flows, either from IMF/World Bank authors (see Arelano et al. 
2005, Heller 2005, Gupta et al. 2006, Rajan and Subramanian 2005, World Bank and IMF 
2005, 2006), or from the academic aid literature (Adam and Bevan 2003, Adam 2005, Bevan 
2005, Gunning 2004). It is argued that increased aid inflows would generate Dutch disease 
effect, through an appreciation of the real exchange rate, with a subsequent loss of 
competitiveness in the tradable sectors, harmful for exports and also for a competitive import 
substitution. Aid can have this effect whatever the exchange rate regime: through the increase 
of the domestic price of non tradable in a fixed exchange rate regime, through the 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate in a regime of floating rate.  
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       Whereas the mechanisms under review are clear, the empirical evidence on the 
occurrence of such a disease seems mitigated (see for instance some studies in Berg et al. 
2005). Gupta, Powell and Yang (2005) present a sample of econometric studies which 
illustrates how contradictory the results are: some authors find a positive link between aid 
inflows and real exchange rate (eg Kasekende and Atingi-Ego 1999 for Ghana), some others a 
negative link. Even the influential paper by Rajan and Subramanian (2005a), where it is 
argued that aid has a negative effect on the share of labour intensive and tradable industries, 
only suggests it could be due to a real appreciation, without really testing this hypothesis, nor 
considering possible effects on other tradable, such as agriculture and tradable services, which 
may be particularly important in small and high aid recipients developing countries. 
 
     Why so little evidence? In the short run the increase of the price of non tradable occurs 
only if there is no underutilised productive capacity in the non tradable sector. If there is such 
capacity, due for instance to disguised urban unemployment, the supply elasticity may be 
relatively high. In the long run a real appreciation will occur following a sustained higher aid 
level only if it is not compensated by an increase of productivity in the non tradable sector, as 
argued by Heller (2005) to recommend aid uses favouring such an increase, what is not so 
easy. 
 
  Moreover in the longer run an increase in productivity in the sector of tradable is 
likely to compensate the effect of a possible rise of the non tradable price on competitiveness. 
If according to the Balassa-Samuelson theorem, a growth of income per capita higher than in 
the rest of the world involves an appreciation of the real exchange rate, the achievement of a 
big push should lead to this appreciation. Then there cannot be a big push without real 
appreciation: if aid succeeds to support a big push, it should make the real value of the 
currency to appreciate. Appreciation no longer becomes a problem, it reflects the success of 
the strategy. 
 
   These arguments have strong implications for economic policy. In the short run, macro 
economic management of increased aid inflows may help to prevent a too fast rise of non 
tradable relative price, although reserves sterilisation can only be a transitory and partial 
solution (Heller 2005). More important is to consider uses of aid as well as of public domestic 
resources.  Needed is to keep a balance between aid allocated to productive sectors and aid to 
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social sectors: aid to increase children health and education will indeed increase productivity, 
but only in the long term. Using aid to improve infrastructure is in that perspective an 
important factor to increase absorptive capacity (Agénor et al. 2005) Briefly stated, aid aiming 
at promoting balanced growth should itself be balanced.  
    
      Threaten of aid volatility: is aid destabilising or stabilising? 
 
            Aid volatility has become a very fashioned topic and one of the favourite arguments to 
enlighten the danger of a rapid aid increase. Aid, if volatile, might be a source of macro 
economic instability and all the more that aid level is higher4. This can be a way by which 
absorptive capacity is revealed. Aid indeed may appear volatile, but it does not mean it is 
destabilising, nor likely to be so, if its level is increased. Let us summarise the conclusions of 
an on going research partly presented in the two other papers (Guillaumont 2006b, Chauvet 
and Guillaumont 2006). 
 
A prior issue is to choose the other flow to which it is relevant to compare aid 
volatility. A usual comparison is with tax revenue, to examine the effect of aid instability on 
public budget stability or with national income. Because the concern is with macroeconomic 
vulnerability, it is preferable is to compare the aid fluctuations (or cycle) to those of exports of 
goods and services, the aggregate the most likely to be affected by exogenous shocks: tax 
revenues, as well as national income, are influenced by the overall impact of exports, but also 
by aid. Moreover, all aid flows are not channelled through the public budget, what makes 
relevant to consider the volatility of the different kinds of aid (Fielding and Mavrotas 2005). 
 
 Comparing total aid (net) to (goods and services) export fluctuations (measured by 
one or another way), our studies quoted above lead to the three following conclusions . 
 
(1)- Over thirty years (1970-99) the average level of aid volatility has been approximately the 
same than that of exports for a large sample of developing countries and half of this level for a 
sub sample of African countries: measured on eight year sub periods by a cycle component 
with regard to a trend drawn from a Hodrick-Prescott filter, both aid and export volatilities are 
                                                 
4
 Bulir and Hamann 2003, 2005; Lensink and Morrissey 2000; Pallage and Robe 2001; Rand and Tarp 2002, 
Eifert. and Gelb 2005). 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E.2006.14 
 
 
13
equal on average to 8.8 percent for the whole sample, while they are respectively of 5.9% ( 
aid) and 11.2% (exports) for the African sub sample. 
 
(2)- Criticism of aid volatility may be misplaced if aid has a compensatory profile, which 
could be consistent with the finding that aid is more effective in more vulnerable countries 
(see above). As previously argued for real exchange rate appreciation, aid volatility would be 
a solution rather than a problem. In that perspective the volatility of aid is not so much to be 
criticized as its pro-cyclicality. With regard to exports, pro-cyclicality appears not to be the 
rule, not even in the majority of cases as it is sometimes asserted. The pro-cyclical character 
of aid is measured by the correlation between the “cycle” of aid (that is, its deviation from its 
trend) and the “cycle” of exports. Using the Hodrick-Prescott filter and considering more than 
one hundred developing countries over the period 1970–99 (broken down in eight year 
subperiods, what result in 465 sub-period observations), the country correlation between the 
cycle of net aid disbursements and the cycle of exports of goods and services appears to be 
nearly as often negative as positive (222 cases versus 243); a similar balance is found for an 
African sub sample: this means that aid is nearly as often countercyclical than procyclical.  
Furthermore in the majority of cases the correlation coefficients on which the comparison 
relies are not significant5. 
        
(3)-Measuring counter- or pro-cyclicality is less relevant than determining whether aid inflow 
is stabilizing or destabilizing with regard to the total aid plus export flow. Pro-cyclical aid can 
still be stabilizing if its volatility, expressed in relative terms, is lower than the volatility of 
exports. There may also be opposite and paradoxical cases where aid is countercyclical and 
destabilizing, when its volatility is significantly higher than that of exports, in a proportion 
depending on the relative levels of aid and exports6. What is the real picture? To assess the 
stabilizing character of aid, we consider an index corresponding to the difference between the 
instability (volatility) of exports and that of the aid plus export flow: if the difference is 
positive, aid is stabilizing; if it is negative, aid is destabilizing. On average, it has been 
stabilizing and more clearly during the 1990s than during the previous periods: on average the 
indicator represents 18 percent of the average value of the instability of exports (28 percent 
for a sub sample of African countries). In the majority of cases where aid was pro-cyclical, it 
                                                 
5
 At a 15 percent threshold 
6
 On one year the arithmetic condition is that the absolute value of the ratio of the relative cycles exceeds one by 
twice the ratio of exports to aid. 
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was then stabilizing. When aid was countercyclical, it was, as expected, generally but not 
always stabilizing. On the whole, aid was destabilizing in less than one tenth of cases. The 
following graph (Graph 1) evidences that the stabilising impact of aid (measured by the 
difference between the two instabilities) is all the more important that the aid GDP ratio is 
higher, and is not significantly influenced by the level of aid volatility. 
      
(4)- In the future, if aid is strongly growing, its potential stabilising or destabilising impact 
with regard to exports will be higher, but the risk of a destabilising impact will remain low 
since, in the case of pro-cyclicality, it is conditioned by a level of volatility higher than that of 
exports. 
 
  As far as export are not the only exogeneous source of instability, it is also relevant to 
examine whether aid contributes to lower or enhance growth volatility, once taken into 
account the influence of traditional structural factors of this overall volatility. Using GMM 
estimator with five year average observations, and initial income per capita, export to GDP 
ratio and export volatility as control variables, it appears that the aid to GDP ratio has a 
significant negative impact on growth volatility (aid to GDP ratio and income per capita 
instrumented) 7 (Chauvet and Guillaumont 2006). 
 
Even if on average aid has been in the past rather stabilising, some policy lessons can 
be drawn from the past experience to avoid a destabilising effect of higher aid levels in the 
future. On the donor side, the principle of conditionality is by itself a potential factor of 
instability, and all the more that donor policies are harmonised (Heller 2005). However the 
move towards a more gradual conditionality, involved by an output based conditionality, may 
lower the risk of aid instability, since the assessment of results or outcome is less dichotomic 
than that of policy measures implementation. Moreover a better transparency in the criteria of 
aid allocation may render aid more predictable and then facilitate the domestic management 
of aid flows. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7
 Aid volatility added alone to the regression does not change the result and is not significant. When a 
multiplicative variable (Aid ratio x Aid volatility) is added it appears significantly positive, suggesting a 
threshold beyond which an increase of the aid to GDP ratio may become a factor of macro economic instability. 
But this last result is not very robust, as it can be expected, since the impact of aid volatility differs from one 
country to another, depending on proper counter cyclicality.  
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Graph 1. Stabilising impact of aid with regard to exports 
according aid to GDP ratio and aid volatility 
 
 
           Finally it is an argument to use more extensively aid as an insurance to smooth public 
and private incomes facing export instability or other shocks. As we have explained elsewhere 
solutions do exist which can be built on a contractual basis involving international 
community, recipient country governments and producer groups, and respect market trends 
(Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney 2003, Guillaumont et al. 2005). They notably 
include grant disbursement and/or debt service adjustment in response to price shocks, and 
support to domestic insurance schemes targeted to agricultural producers.  
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           On the recipient side a higher aid dependency needs a cautious management of the 
domestic fiscal space. The government has to be able to keep some flexibility in public 
expenditures and to save some potential of domestic borrowing. It may also find appropriate 
to accumulate a certain level of foreign reserves likely to be used to smooth the impact of aid 
inflows.   
 
4 - Decreasing returns: more slowly in vulnerable countries 
 
Absorptive capacity, in the most usual meaning of the concept, is associated with 
decreasing returns. There may be decreasing returns of aid, as for any other factor. However 
decreasing returns do not exclude increasing returns below some aid level, consistently with 
the big push hypothesis. An additional analytical difficulty comes from that the turning points 
are likely to differ among recipient countries, depending on their own characteristics. Here we 
focus on their structural vulnerability, since this feature has appeared in our previous works to 
be a significant factor of aid effectiveness. To argue that vulnerability influences the profile of 
aid marginal returns we rely both on macro and micro evidence. 
 
    Lessons from growth regressions: is big push justified by vulnerability? 
     
 The test of the decreasing marginal returns of aid has been an important piece of the 
debate about aid-growth relationships. In the growth regressions both the aid variable and its 
squared value were included among the explanatory variables, with respectively positive and 
negative coefficients expected. This specification involved not only a decreasing marginal 
impact of aid on growth, but also that, beyond a certain level, an aid increase is detrimental to 
growth (inverse U curb). The turning point could be considered as a measurement of 
absorptive capacity. Conversely if the coefficients are respectively negative and positive or 
only significant and positive for the squared term, it is an argument in favour of a big push. 
 
The estimation including the aid term and its squared value has been run initially by 
Hadjimichael et al. (1995), referring to absorptive capacity constraints, then became a usual 
practice (Burnside and Dollar 2000, Collier and Dollar 2001, 2002, Hansen and Tarp 2000, 
2001, Lensink and White 2001). Results strongly differed, with the squared term either 
significantly negative or unsignificant. They depend in particular, as clearly documented by 
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Hansen and Tarp, on whether another non linearity is introduced in the model through a 
multiplicative term of aid.  
 
      In previous works on the influence of vulnerability on aid effectiveness (Guillaumont 
and Chauvet 2001, Chauvet and Guillaumont 2004), non linearity was introduced through a 
multiplicative term (aid x vulnerability index), but without the aid squared term: results 
suggested that aid is more effective in more vulnerable countries or in other words that the 
negative impact of vulnerability is dampened by aid. A more recent paper focused on Africa 
(Chauvet and Guillaumont 2006) results in a similar conclusion, with the instability of goods 
and services export as only measure of vulnerability, what allows us to assess the stabilising 
impact of aid examined above. Regressions are run on a sample of 38 African countries on 6 
five year periods (with GMM and additional instrumentation of aid). Controlling for aid ratio 
and export instability levels, we obtain a significant positive impact on growth of either the 
multiplicative variable (aid x export instability) or of the indicator of the stabilisation impact 
of aid (the difference between the instability of exports and the instability of the aggregate 
flow (export + aid)). In these specifications, the marginal effectiveness of aid does depend on 
vulnerability, but not on the aid level. It suggests that if there were a turning point according 
to the aid level (evidenced by a significant coefficient of squared value of aid), this point 
would  be moved away by a higher vulnerability9.    
 
            To simultaneously test the existence of two successive turning points corresponding 
the first to a minimum amount of aid below which it is not effective (an approach to the big 
push), the second to the level beyond which it is no longer effective (a measure of the 
absorptive capacity), it might be conceivable to estimate the growth regression with not only 
the aid variable and its squared value, but also its cubic value, expecting the coefficients to be 
successively negative, positive and negative, and the returns being the two turning points 
                                                 
9
 To go further we wonder what would be the results when, into the last model we add the squared value of 
aid/GDP ratio to the multiplicative variable (aid ratio x export instability)? According to very preliminary 
results, aid still dampens the negative effects of instability, but its marginal return is increasing, starting from a 
negative level and reaching a positive level beyond a turning point (an U curb), which corresponds to a very high 
level of aid ratio, all the more lowered that the export instability is higher: marginal aid effectiveness becomes 
positive for an aid ratio of 10% if export instability  is around 25%; This intriguing result could be used either as 
a support to the big push thesis or as an argument against aid, whether the attention is brought to the increasing 
returns or to their negative level on a wide range. One may of course question the validity of the method used to 
determine thresholds.  
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successively increasing and decreasing. Then the two approaches could be reconciled. 
However this specification is not really appropriate: there is no reason to expect negative 
marginal returns rather than nil returns below the first threshold, and even beyond the second 
one. This is why a better method seems to look for the thresholds which empirically 
differentiate the aid growth relationships according to the level of aid. This has been done by 
Gomanae, Girma and Morrissey (2003). They find that aid becomes effective in contributing 
to growth beyond 2% of GNP and no evidence of diminishing returns to aid afterwards. But, 
using annual growth data, they may capture short term rather than long term aid effects. 
Moreover the threshold is supposed to be the same for all countries. Yet it is most likely that 
the aid effectiveness thresholds depend on the specific features of recipient countries.  
 
      New micro evidence from project evaluation, confirming the impact of vulnerability 
 
The ambiguous results of growth regressions regarding the aid effectiveness thresholds 
may be due to some extent to the heterogeneity of aid aggregates, including projects, budget 
support, debt relief, technical assistance, etc. For this reason it is useful to consider a more 
homogeneous set of aid inflows, for instance a set of projects, and to analyse whether their 
results seem to depend on the total amount of aid, and specific features of recipient countries 
as well. If our assumption that aid marginal returns are influenced by the vulnerability of 
countries, this should be reflected at the micro level, as we see now. 
 
In a working paper by Guillaumont and Laajaj 2006 we consider the results of the 
evaluation of World Bank projects conducted by the Independent Evaluation Group of the 
Bank. In this data base the outcome of the projects is measured on a six scale notation ranging 
from very unsatisfactory to very satisfactory. It makes easy to examine if the rate of success is 
influenced by the level of aid in the recipient countries and if this relationship depends on its 
economic vulnerability:  we surmise that the rate of success decreases when the total amount 
of aid increases, but to less extent in the countries highly vulnerable. 
 
        Intuitive support to this view is given by a three dimension graph  (Graph 2) representing 
the average success of projects according to the combined levels of export instability and aid 
to GDP ratio. The success rate10 of the projects split up into nine groups: “low aid” 
                                                 
10
 A project is considered successful if it has been rated at least moderately satisfactory. 
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corresponds to the third of projects that have been carried out in countries receiving the lowest 
level of ODA (less than 1 % of GDP), “high aid” to the upper third (more than 8 % of GDP), 
and so “medium aid ”to the intermediate third, while are identically separated the upper, 
middle and lower thirds of projects according to the export instability of the countries, 
weighted by the export to GDP ratio. 
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        Graph 2. Slower decreasing returns of aid when exports are more unstable 
       
It appears that for a low level of aid, the average success rate is 15 points higher in a 
stable country. However, in stable countries, this rate decreases sharply when the level of aid 
increases, suggesting a limited absorptive capacity, while in the most unstable countries, the 
success rate does not decrease clearly: it is even the highest in the most aided countries; 
moreover in these last countries the average success of projects is the higher the more 
unstable the countries are. 
 
Some econometric estimations evidence these relationships. Following Kaufman and 
Wang (1995), Isham, Kaufman and Pritchett (1997), Isham and Kaufman(1999) and Levin 
and Dollar (2005) we estimate the factors determining the success of World Bank projects, 
but we do not aggregate project data at the national level, so that regressions are run at the 
micro level with an observation for each project. Since the outcome of the projects is 
measured on a six scale notation, our econometric model is an ordered logit. It combines 
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factors related to the characteristics of the project (sector, IDA or IBRD conditions...) and to 
the characteristics of the country (income per capita, level of education, quality of institutions, 
…) (as well as year dummies). Its specificity for our concern is to test the influence of these 
other following variables: 
- the total aid to GDP ratio, to identify possible aid decreasing (or increasing) returns 
(variable introduced also by Dollar and Levin); 
- the volatility of exports, which is a source of unstable environment likely to be 
harmful to carry out projects; 
- one variable multiplicative of the two previous ones, consistently with our previous 
finding at the macro level (with Lisa Chauvet) that aid dampens the negative 
effects of external shocks. 
We expect the success of projects to decline when the total amount of aid increases and when 
the recipient country faces external shocks (export instability), while the impact of the 
interactive (multiplicative) variable (aid x instability) be positive11. The results of the base 
regression do not reject our hypotheses. The success of projects is less decreasing in more 
unstable countries, what emphasises the needs of aid in vulnerable countries. 
 
Another finding is about the role of education in the success of projects. The rate of 
success is positively influenced by the level of education, but a low level of education 
dampens the negative impact of aid size on the success of projects: when a multiplicative 
variable of aid and education is introduced in the model, it appears to have a significant 
negative impact. This should not be surprising: aid has a knowledge content which makes its 
marginal impact higher the lower the level of education (similar finding in Gomanae et al. 
2003). 
 
                                                 
11
 In this model the success of project, which is directly estimated, is found decreasing when the coefficient of 
the aid value received by the implementing country is negative. Then if the outcome of projects is declining 
when the total amount of aid increases and if it is lower when the recipient country faces external shocks (export 
instability), the positive expected impact of the interactive (multiplicative) variable (aid x instability) means, as 
in the growth model, that aid dampens the effect of instability. By comparison in the aid-growth model the 
marginal return of aid is given by the first derivative of growth and is found positive and decreasing with the 
coefficients of aid and of its squared value are respectively positive and negative: in the aid-growth model aid 
lowers the negative impact of instability even if there are constant returns, in the success-of-project model the 
decrease of aid project outcome is slowed down by instability. When instability is high, aid outcome may cease 
to decrease or even be increasing. 
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Considering that both vulnerability and low human capital are factors of slower 
decline of aid effectiveness and that these two features are precisely, with a low level of 
income, the identification criteria of the Least Developed Countries, it suggests that the 
function of success of projects may differ between these countries and the other developing 
countries. While vulnerability and lack of human capital are negative factors of the average 
success of projects, they make this success less declining, or even increasing when the level of 
aid increases, what do not preclude such a decline beyond a certain level of aid: it means that 
they would push further the limits of absorptive capacity. We then estimated a success-of-
project model where the explanatory variables are the aid to GDP ratio, its  squared value, and 
a dummy variable for LDCs, introduced both additively and multiplicatively of the aid ratio 
and its squared value12. The results are represented in the following graph (Graph 3). In the 
non LDCs developing countries the outcome of projects is generally higher than in LDCs, but 
declines when aid increases (the turning point around  a 25% aid ratio is not empirically 
relevant since in only less than 1% of cases countries reach this level of aid). In LDCs the 
average rate of success increases when aid to GDP ratio increases, at least below a threshold 
estimated around 17% in the estimation corresponding to the graph 3, and do not decrease 
quickly beyond it (25% of cases beyond this point). Clearly, even if the LDCs obtain a lower 
average rate of success, they evidence increasing returns to aid and a higher absorptive 
capacity. 
 
A last but not less intriguing result of the previous estimations is that institutions do 
not appear as a significant factor of the success of projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 The variables corresponding to the identification of LDCs, income per capita, vulnerability, lack of human 
capital are excluded. 
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Graph 3.  Least Developped Countries : initial handicap 
but higher absorptive capacity
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5 - Institutions weakening : towards performance based conditionality 
 
The relationships between aid and the institutions of recipient countries have been 
examined in the literature from three different angles. First in the aid effectiveness literature 
institutions (and policy) have been presented as a crucial factor of effectiveness (in the 
“ABCD paradigm” of Assessing Aid, Burnside, Collier, Dollar), a factor, as well known, 
strongly debated. Second the impact of institutions on inter country aid allocation has been 
analysed and debated, both as a positive issue and as a normative issue, in particular with the 
aim to assess  the selectivity of donors (Amprou, Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney, 
2006). Third the effect of aid on the quality of policies and institutions has been for a long 
time a matter of concern and now meets a topical interest as it could significantly limit 
absorptive capacity. Relying on some past and recent views on this third matter, we try to see 
what can be the appropriate answer to prevent aid from weakening the institutions of recipient 
countries.  
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The institutional dimension of absorptive capacity 
 
Is aid dependency lessening domestic institutions, which are now considered as an 
important factor of economic growth? Several potential negative effects of large aid inflows 
on institutions have been identified, mainly the effect passing through a detrimental impact of 
aid on private saving, the impact on state revenue and the consequences on the accountability 
of public management ( or the link between the state and the civil society). 
 
The crowding out effect of aid on savings has been the first analytical attack against 
foreign aid and was largely debated, in particular on empirical grounds (Griffin 1970, 
Papanek 1973). A common conclusion at the aggregate level was that even if aid has a short 
term negative impact on savings, it however increases investment and doing so contributes 
through a higher income to a long term increase of the saving ratio (Guillaumont 1985). The 
crowding out effect relied on two basic assumptions, linked to policy and institutions. Aid 
was first supposed to grasp the better investment opportunities and then discourage private 
savings and investment: it would thus exert an institutional effect on the financial system, the 
deepening of which be reduced. It was not sure that this effect resulted more from aid than 
from other sources of external finance and it has not been deeply investigated. 
 
The second crowding out effect, related to fiscal revenue, has been more extensively 
examined, both through cross section and country case studies. However results are mitigated, 
as it appears in the survey by Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle (2006). Even if the literature 
finds more often than not a negative relationship, it raises several problems. A first one is due 
to the heterogeneity of aid flows and of tax receipts, with possible specific responses of each 
kind of tax to each kind of aid: Gupta et al.(2004) suggest that grants, but not loans have a 
negative effect on total tax revenue, while Mavrotas, 2005, (who also consider the effects on 
the different kinds of public expenditure) argues that “in Uganda the government did not 
reduce its tax effort following additional disbursements of the different types of foreign aid”. 
A second problem is related to aid endogeneity: aid and fiscal receipts are linked by reciprocal 
relations and may be influenced by common factors, while the instrumentation of the aid 
variable is often unsatisfactory. Finally and most importantly studies focused on the short 
term impact of aid inflows do not allow one to capture the long term and institutional effects.  
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As for long run effects we face two opposite views. On one side an aid dependency 
concern leads to underline the risk to see the state depending too much on foreign aid and thus 
to be accountable to foreign donors rather than to the national population or civil society. In 
that perspective crowding out of fiscal revenue is considered as a factor of weak 
accountability, since governments do not need to maintain their legitimacy to collect revenue 
(Moss et al. 2006). It is not sure however that collecting taxes is always a factor of democracy 
and institution building, as the heavy taxation of African agriculture in the seventies and 
afterwards has shown. On the other side aid increase can be considered as a transitory impulse 
generating pump priming effects which will make aid itself less and less needed. A good 
example is also given by tax policy: if aid allows a country to reduce high and distortionary 
taxation, it will help to break an obstacle to growth and possibly lead in the future to a larger 
amount of public revenue (Gunning 2004). 
 
The more detrimental effects of aid on institutions are other ones and mainly due to 
the ways by which aid is delivered. There is indeed a socio political dimension of absorptive 
capacity, but to some extent it comes from aid modalities. This may seem paradoxical since a 
larger and larger part of aid is devoted to budget support which is conditioned by policy 
reform. Traditional conditionality has been strongly criticised. In particular it has been argued 
that it was inefficient due to the common interest of the partners to do as if it was efficient 
(Collier et al.1997). This criticism has found an utmost  expression in the hypothesis, made by 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), that aid has no effect on policy. This hypothesis, has been 
challenged not only in cross section studies (see for instance Chauvet and Guillaumont 
200413), but also and more significantly by the African case studies achieved at the request of 
the World Bank (Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren 2001 and the comments by Berg 2004 and 
Tarp 2003): it is difficult not to recognise that the intense policy dialogue between donors and 
recipient governments has not led to some significant policy decisions or institution reforms. 
 
However the crucial issue of ownership, already raised in the initial criticism of 
conditionality, seems to remain unsolved: the pressure of donors to “obtain” policy measures 
and reforms and the commitment of recipient countries to account for to external agents lead 
the governments and civil servants in these countries not to feel fully responsible for their 
                                                 
13
 Tests do not reject our hypothesis that policy is all the more improved by aid that its previous quality is 
weaker, what leads to an aid effectiveness depending negatively from the previous policy (and positively from 
the current one).   
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action. Moreover they are less inclined to justify their action otherwise than by their external 
commitments. “The hypothesis here is that large aid flows fundamentally alter the relationship 
between government, elites and local citizens” (Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle 2006). 
This lack of ownership and accountability to citizens is enhanced by the weight of donors 
advice, presence, missions and own agenda, as stressed by Elliot Berg in his last and 
posthumous paper (2003).         
 
Why a performance-based conditionality is an answer to the drawback of aid 
dependency 
 
 Face to the socio political limits to absorptive capacity, a usual answer of donors is to 
consider that the weak administrative capacity is the main source of the difficulties and has to 
be enhanced. The reinforcement of capacities has thus been a goal of aid, well reflected in the 
share of technical assistance. A future increase of aid should then justify a further move in this 
direction. It is a reasonable principle. However it has sometimes been implemented in a 
poorly efficient manner. A common practice is to set up autonomous agencies in order to 
attract the best civil servants, with higher wages, possibly after appropriate training, and avoid 
administrative inertia. It is a short term search for efficiency, but often a factor of 
discouragement within traditional administration. Policy aiming at diminishing the number of 
civil servants and pay them more, possibly after appropriate training, is longer term focused, 
although it may be politically difficult. 
 
         The diagnostic about the drawbacks of aid dependency calls for deeper reform in aid 
practice. In previous papers we have argued in favour of an outcome-based or performance-
based conditionality for budget support, instead of a conditionality based on the adoption of 
policy changes (Collier et al. 1997, Adam et al. 2004). Performance would be measured, as 
much as possible, in terms of ultimate objectives, such as reduced child mortality or 
knowledge acquisition by children. To quote us, “A performance based approach allows for 
better ownership of reforms, since the choice of instruments would reside with the country; it 
avoids arbitrary judgement on multiple heterogeneous economic policy measures; and it 
facilitates gradual and progressive support according to the degree of progress of performance 
relative to outturns; and by eliminating the scope of discordant conditionality, it supports 
better coordination between donors” (Adam et al. 2004). 
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The principle of this proposal has not met strong criticism. But the likelihood of its 
implementation by a significant number of donors has appeared rather limited. Even the 
European Union which has taken the pioneering initiative of a reform in that direction has 
stayed half way, as the conditions retained refer to intermediate indicators close to policy 
instruments (Ibid.). The main hindrances to the full implementation of a performance-based 
conditionality are twofold. One is a lack of trust in the capacity and will of the recipient 
countries, a lack which creates a vicious circle since without ownership capacities will not 
really develop. The second and probably more important one is the weight of habits within aid 
agencies. Full performance based conditionality would involve a dramatic change of their job, 
which would be devoted to monitor and assess the progress in the results obtained by 
countries for a few number of  final indicators of development, taking into account the impact 
of  exogeneous factors, independent of the policy. 
 
       As for countries where there is no minimal state or in the lasting failing states, it may 
not be possible to undertake such a reform. At least transitorily increased aid inflows should 
be delivered more directly through technical assistance and projects bypassing the failing 
states (Chauvet and Collier 2005), in particular implemented through civil societies 
organisations (EGDI 2006, Cohen, Guillaumont Jeanneney et Jacquet 2006). 
 
 
   
6 - Conclusion: how to reconcile the two approaches 
 
      In this paper we have neither rejected the relevance of a big push nor denied the 
existence of serious limits to absorptive capacity, while considering that both require further 
analysis. The limits to absorptive capacity do not lead to give up the big push, on the contrary 
a big push seems needed to push away these limits. However it is feasible only if aid policies 
are designed consistently. The general conclusion we draw to reconcile the two approaches is 
that absorptive capacity strongly depends on aid itself or on its very modalities. Big push and 
absorptive capacity approaches cannot be reconciled without an aid reform coming with aid 
increase. In that perspective following main lessons can be drawn from the previous analysis. 
 
         First, needed is to balance the utilisation of aid between directly productive and 
social activities, in order to avoid transitory loss of competitiveness. 
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              Second, schemes helping to use aid as insurance against exogeneous shocks are to be 
enhanced because they lower the risk of Dutch disease and contribute to a faster and more 
equitable long term growth. 
 
              Third, due to the higher marginal impact of aid in vulnerable countries and in 
particular the Least Developed Countries, where the need of a big push is the clearest,  
priority should be given to these countries in aid allocation. 
 
 .      Finally, as much as possible, a performance-based conditionality should be 
substituted to the traditional policy-based one in order to cope with several absorptive 
capacity limitations, most importantly the socio-political one. An aid supported big push will 
not be effective without a new ownership of their policies by the recipient countries.  
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